Why a Nuke Park?

Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (who, in 1997 received a doctorate in civil engineering and traffic transportation planning from Iran University of Science and Technology (IUST)) boasted recently about his country's accumulating knowledge of the difficult, dirty, and dangerous technology of nuclear weapons. He made his brag about Iran's progress toward mastering this antiquated form of weapons science and engineering on National Technology Day, a holiday created some years ago by Mr. Ahmadinejad himself, while attempting to stir public interest in Iran's "nuclear energy achievements". He also reported about Iran's recent "development of five new medicines and a homemade electron accelerator". Perhaps he hoped that these modest claims will help to give Iran some "street cred"; i.e, akin to that of the bizarrely bellicose North Korea, with its recent development and testing of small nuclear devices, along with the missiles which may eventually be able to deliver them to distant targets.

Meanwhile, in the USA there is an ongoing effort among military enthusiasts to commemorate the 1940's design and testing of American nuclear weapons in the form of a system of national parks proposed for Los Alamos, NM, Oak Ridge, TN, and Hanford, WA. The motivation underlying this project is unclear: is this seemingly boastful idea simply fear-driven, or is it an expression of some American bellicosity?

Los Alamos was where the nuclear bombs were first designed and built, Oak Ridge was where U235 fuel for the Hiroshima bomb (Little Boy) was obtained (purified from naturally occurring uranium in a gaseous diffusion process), and Hanford was where Pu239 for the Nagasaki bomb (Fat Man) was produced (by chemical extraction from the radioactive detritus of dedicated nuclear reactors.) The Hiroshima bomb of 6 Aug 1945 killed between 90,000 and 166,000 persons; the Nagasaki bomb of 9 Aug 1945 killed upwards of 40,000 persons. However, neither of these two attacks were quite as deadly as the 9-10 March, 1945 attack on Tokyo by B-29's armed with incendiary bombs; in this raid, more than 100,000 people died. Earlier, in the bombing of Dresden, on nights between 13-15 Feb 1945, more than 22,000 persons died. Presumably, none of these horrifying facts would be mentioned on any of the placards adorning the proposed national parks.

To celebrate the creation of weapons of mass destruction in a national park setting, a setting normally geared towards serene contemplation, and towards the diversion and education of young people, seems wrong-headed in the extreme. The weapons enthusiasts who are making this bizarre proposal should be ashamed.

DOE/NNSA Safety Problems

As Department Of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) struggles to maintain the viability of the U. S. nuclear weapons complex, new problems have emerged with its safety practices. These problems may be a reflection of the inherent difficulty of dealing consistently and successfully with the antiquated and dangerous technology of nuclear weapons.

Today, the New York Time's Matthew Wald described the continued failure of DOE/NNSA to complete the Hanford, Washington  Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) construction project. Currently, it is estimated that this project has been 60% completed, and that its total cost will be in excess of $12 billion. Many problems with the design of WTP have been identified recently, which reflect safety concerns, and required changes to the design may be extensive. Senator Ron Wyden (Dem. Oregon), who chairs the Senate Energy Committee, with DOE oversight responsibility, is focusing his attention on this problem.
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1 April 2013 / In a letter, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Chairman Peter Winokur reported to U. S. Sen. Ron Wyden about the state of nuclear safety at Hanford Site. Three separate areas of concern were addressed: (1) safety issues associated with the Hanford Tank Farms; (2) unresolved technical matters related to the design of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP); (3) the current state of Hanford's safety culture. DNFSB performed this study at Sen. Wyden's request.
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27 March 2013 / Outgoing DOE Sec. Chu wrote to DNFSB to inform them that the status of the safety upgrade at LANL's PF-4 (Plutonium Facility) has progressed to the extent that he now felt it acceptable to proceed with normal operations at PF-4. DNFSB had previously pointed out to DOE/NNSA the potentially hazardous conditions existing at PF-4. DNFSB may or may not agree with Chu's latest assessment.
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25 March 2013 / Acting DOE Sec. Nielie Miller wrote to DNFSB to inform them of the status of upgrades to the criticality safety program and procedures at all of the DOE/NNSA facilities. The problems with criticality safety procedures at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) seem to be the most serious, when compared with the other DOE/NNSA facilities. By contrast, excellent performance, in terms of criticality safety, has been turned in at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).
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DNFSB organized the Pantex Public Meeting, of 14 March, 2013, to inquire into alleged deficiencies in Pantex Plant's safety culture:

Testimony (excerpted) of Ms. Neile Miller
Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
& Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security /U.S. Department of Energy

To the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Pantex Plant Public Meeting
Amarillo Civic Center
401 S. Buchanan Street
Amarillo, TX, 79101
14 March 2013

INTRODUCTION
In my time here with you today, I want to assure you of two things. First, I am fully aware of the significant safety culture concerns that have been raised by our workers here at the Pantex Plant. Second, we are engaged in —and fully committed to — the timely resolution of any and all nuclear safety deficiencies within the Department, be they cultural, managerial, contractual, design, or operational in origin. This holds true across the NNSA as well as the broader DOE complex, including Environmental Management. I reaffirm the Administration’s and the Department’s commitment to safe and secure work environments for all Federal and contractor employees.

BACKGROUND DISCUSSION
As you know, the Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) recently completed an assessment  of the safety culture at the Pantex Plant. The results were sobering; so sobering in fact, that my staff immediately convened to discuss options that could be quickly implemented to address these findings, even as we contemplate longer-term actions to fully implement the recommendations from the HSS report

SAFETY CULTURE ACTIONS
Immediately following the briefing by HSS regarding its safety culture findings at Pantex,  NNSA issued a letter to Babcock & Wilcox /Pantex directing immediate focus at all management and working  levels to a safety conscious work environment (SCWE) for all on-going activities and operations.

CONCLUSION
As an organization tasked with one of the Nation’s most critical missions, we at DOE understand the fundamental, make-or-break challenges that our work entails. The safe and successful execution of our mission greatly affects our Nation’s safety and security, and demands the very best of all of us, year in and year out. That is why it is so important to embed the commitment to safety deeply in the culture of the NNSA enterprise, so that it will be embraced by all those who succeed us. Our safety culture is critical to protecting and improving the NNSA legacy. We must not fail in this effort.

Our commitment to safety is reflected in the personal passion for safety that the Secretary has expressed on several occasions. His message is clear, and my senior managers and I reinforce it whenever we meet with our workers and stakeholders: The Department has an unwavering commitment to maintain safe and secure work environments for all Federal and contractor employees. Furthermore, we will ensure that the Department’s and contractor’s operations do not adversely affect the health, safety, or security of the surrounding communities or the nation.
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Letter (paraphrased) from Paul Matney, Ed. D., President of Amarillo College, dated March 7, 2013 to DNFSB:

President Matney describes the great importance of Babcock & Wilcox /Pantex jobs to the Amarillo community. He says that B&W Pantex is the third largest local employer and gives jobs to 3000 local residents. According to Matney, "Pantex Plant and its workers have long been a vital part of the Texas Panhandle community and its mission remains critical to the safety and security of our nation."
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